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Some key criteria in the optimal currency area literature are that countries should 
join a currency union if they have closer international trade links and more 
symmetric business cycles. However, both criteria are endogenous. Frankel and 
Rose (1998) find that trade intensity increases cycle correlation among industrial 
countries. We study whether the same result holds true for the case of developing 
countries, as their different patterns of international trade and specialization may 
lead to cyclical asymmetries among them and between industrial and developing 
countries. We gather annual information for 147 countries for 1960-99 (33,676 
country pairs) and find: (i) countries with higher bilateral trade exhibit higher 
business cycle synchronization, with an increase of one standard deviation in 
bilateral trade intensity raising the output correlation from 0.05 to 0.09 for all 
country pairs; (ii) countries with more asymmetric structures of production exhibit 
a smaller business cycle correlation; (iii) the impact of trade integration on 
business cycles is higher for industrial countries than both developing and   
industrial-developing country pairs; (iv) a one standard deviation increase in 
bilateral trade intensity leads to surges in output correlation from 0.25 to 0.39 
among industrial countries, from 0.08 to 0.10 for our sample of industrial-
developing country pairs, and from 0.03 to 0.06 among developing countries; (v) 
the impact of trade intensity on cycle correlation is smaller the greater the 
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 1. Introduction 
 
The recent creation of the European Monetary Union (EMU) and the recent debate on 
dollarization in several developing countries have renewed the interest in the economics of 
currency unions. Countries forming a currency union typically benefit from the reduction in 
transaction costs associated to trade and investment flows and thus may benefit from economic 
specialization (Rose, 2000). However, these microeconomic efficiency benefits may be offset by 
the loss of macroeconomic flexibility associated with a common currency. In particular, 
countries joining a currency union may lose their ability to stabilize cyclical fluctuations through 
independent counter-cyclical monetary policy. Both the benefits and the costs of currency unions 
depend on the characteristics of the countries involved. 
Traditional literature on optimal currency areas (OCAs)—which began during the early 
1960s with the work of Mundell (1961) and McKinnon (1963)—aims at establishing the 
conditions under which the benefits of joining a currency union would outweigh its costs. 
Among the key criteria considered in the OCA literature is the degree of trade integration among 
the potential members, as well as the degree of symmetry of their business cycles.
1 The degree of 
integration matters because the reduction in transaction costs associated with the use of a 
common currency will have a larger impact the larger the size of the trade and investment flows 
among the member countries. The symmetry of the business cycle, in turn, plays a key role in 
determining the cost of sacrificing an independent monetary policy. In summary, countries with 
close international trade links are more likely to be members of an OCA, whereas countries with 
asymmetric business cycles are less likely to be members of an OCA. 
While the traditional OCA literature treats these criteria as exogenous, recent literature 
argues that both trade integration and cycle synchronization are in fact endogenous (Frankel and 
Rose, 1997 and 1998). First, currency unions can affect trade intensity. In fact, recent empirical 
literature stresses the large positive effects of currency unions on trade (Rose, 2000; Glick and 
Rose, 2001).
2  Trade intensity, in turn, may affect cycle correlation. Empirical studies for the case 
                                                 
1 Additional OCA criteria, such as the degree of labor mobility, wage flexibility, or the existence of fiscal transfers 
among the members, relate to the cost of processing the necessary adjustments in the case of asymmetric shocks 
among the member countries when independent monetary policy has been foregone. 
2 New evidence suggests that Rose and associates might be overestimating the impact of currency unions on trade 
due to: (a) problems of sample selection and non-linearities (Persson, 2001), and (b) not adequately taking into 
account the possibility that joining a currency union could be an endogenous decision (Tenreyro, 2001). A recent 
paper by Micco, Stein and Ordoñez (2002) finds the impact of EMU on trade to be on the order of 15 percent. 
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 of industrial countries (Frankel and Rose, 1997, 1998; Fatas, 1997; Clark and van Wincoop, 
2001) provide evidence that countries with closer trade linkages exhibit highly correlated 
business cycles. This finding motivated Frankel and Rose to state that countries that are ex ante 
poor candidates to enter a monetary union could satisfy the criteria ex post because entry to the 
currency union per se may provide an additional impulse for trade expansion that may result, in 
turn, in higher business cycle correlation. 
As is obvious from the discussion above, the link between trade intensity and business 
cycle correlation plays a crucial role when considering the merits of a currency union among 
countries that a priori do not seem to comply with the OCA criteria. But are the lessons derived 
from the experience of industrial countries useful in helping to guide policy decisions in 
developing countries? Theory suggests that, in the case of developing countries, the lessons 
derived from the experience of industrial countries should be handled with a great deal of 
caution. 
According to the theoretical literature, the impact of trade integration on business cycle 
correlation could go either way. On the one hand, if the demand channel is the dominant force 
driving business cycles, we expect trade integration to increase cycle correlation. For instance, 
positive output shocks in a country might increase its demand for foreign goods. The impact of 
this shock on the cycle of the country’s trading partners should depend on the depth of the trade 
links with each of the partners. On the other hand, if industry-specific shocks are the dominant 
force in explaining cyclical output, the relationship would be negative if increasing specialization 
in production leads to inter-industry trade (as usually observed in developing countries). In this 
case, trade integration leads to specialization in different industries, which in turn leads to 
asymmetric effects of industry-specific shocks. In contrast, if intra-industry trade prevails (as 
observed in industrial countries), specialization does not necessarily lead to asymmetric effects 
of industry-specific shocks, since the pattern of specialization occurs mainly within industries. In 
summary, the total effect of trade intensity on cycle correlation is theoretically ambiguous and 
poses a question that could only be solved empirically. However, the important differences in the 
pattern of trade and specialization among country pairs of different type suggest that the impact 
of trade integration on cycle correlation in developing countries may differ substantially from 
that among industrial countries.  
  6 
 Our paper extends the study of Frankel and Rose (1998) in order to analyze the impact of 
trade integration on business cycle correlation not only among industrial countries but also 
among developing countries, as well as among “mixed” (industrial-developing) country pairs. By 
working with a sample of 147 industrial and developing countries, we are able to test whether the 
links between trade intensity and business cycle correlation are different depending on the nature 
of the countries involved. We expect the impact to differ across groups of countries, due to their 
different patterns of trade and specialization (i.e., inter- vs. intra-industry trade patterns). Our 
prior is that trade intensity should have a positive effect on cyclical output correlation among 
industrial countries, and a smaller (and ambiguous) effect among other country pairs. 
In studying the effects of trade intensity on cycle correlation, we follow the recent OCA 
literature by taking into account the fact that trade intensity itself may be endogenous (Frankel 
and Rose, 1998), through at least two different channels. First, cycle correlation could lead to 
currency unions, which in turn could lead to increased trade intensity. Second, by joining a 
currency union, countries reduce transaction costs, and at the same time link their monetary 
policies to that of their partners. While lower transaction costs increase trade links, convergence 
in macroeconomic policies (i.e., countries sharing a common monetary policy stance) might lead 
to higher output correlation. Therefore, a positive relationship between trade intensity and cycle 
correlation could potentially be due to both variables being explained by a third factor, namely 
the formation of a currency union. Among our main findings, we conclude that: 
 
(1)  On average, higher trade integration leads to higher business cycle 
synchronization. This result is robust to changes in the measure of bilateral 
trade intensity, to the de-trending techniques used to compute cyclical output, 
or the estimation method (OLS or IV). 
(2) Our coefficient estimates suggest that the correlation between cyclical output 
increases from a starting mean of 0.05 to 0.09 when the bilateral trade 
intensity increases by one standard deviation. 
(3) The impact of trade intensity on business cycle correlation for industrial 
countries is significantly higher than the one for the sample of developing 
countries and the sample of “mixed” country pairs. In particular, a one 
standard deviation increase in our coefficient of bilateral trade leads to a surge 
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 in our business cycle correlation from a starting mean of: (a) 0.25 to 0.399 for 
industrial countries, (b) 0.075 to 0.104 for our sample of mixed country pairs, 
and (c) 0.031 to 0.059 for our sample of developing countries. Note that the 
result in (a) is similar to the one found by Frankel and Rose (1998), although 
we are working with a larger sample and different time period. 
(4)  We find robust evidence of a negative interaction effect between trade 
integration and an index of asymmetries in the structure of production (which 
we use as a proxy for the extent of inter-industry trade). As expected, the 
impact of trade intensity on cycle correlation is larger when countries have 
similar production structures. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some theoretical insights 
regarding the relationship between trade integration and the synchronization of business cycles. 
Section 3 discusses the data and presents the econometric methodology used in our empirical 
evaluation. Section 4 discusses the main empirical results and relevant extensions. Finally, 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  Some Theoretical Insights 
 
In order to understand the different channels through which trade intensity can impact business 
cycle synchronization, we follow Frankel and Rose (1998) in using Stockman’s (1988) 
decomposition of the growth rate of the economy at time t, dlnyit, as the weighted average of the 
growth rates in every sector of the economy d lnykit (with k=1,...,n), with the weights (ωki) being 




kit ki t i y d y d ln ln , ω                 (1) 
If we express the growth rate in sector k at time t as deviations from the country’s 




kit ki it y d η ξ ω + = ∑ ln              (2) 
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 where the growth rate of real output for the domestic country at time t (d lnyit) consists of the 
weighted average of sector-specific deviations of the growth rate of output in sector k at time t 
(ξkit = d lnykit - d ln y•it) and the average growth rate of total output of the country at time t (ηit).  
Analogously, we define the growth rate of the foreign country (country j) as:  
jt
k
kjt kj j y d η ξ ω + = ∑
* ln                (2*) 
Following Stockman (1988) we assume that: (i) {ξkit} is distributed independently of each other 
across both sector and time, with sectoral variance σk
2; (ii) ξkit = ξkjt, that is industry shocks are 
similar across countries, and have the same variance σk
2; (iii) {ηit} is distributed independently 
over time; (iv) {ξkit} and {ηit} are independent from each other. Given these assumptions, we can 
compute the covariance between the growth rates of the domestic and foreign countries, i.e., σ(yi 
,yj)= cov(d ln yit, d ln yjt): 




kj ki k j i y y η η σ ω ω σ σ + = ∑        (3) 
where  σ(ηi,ηj) is the covariance between country-specific aggregate shocks. In terms of 
correlation coefficients, we can reformulate (3) as: 
* , ,
2 * ~ ~ ) , ( η η η ρ ω σ ω ω ρ y
k
k kj ki j i y y + = ∑     (4) 
where  ρ(yi,yj) represents the output correlation, ρ(ηi,ηj) is the correlation between country-
specific aggregate shocks, ω )
ki = ωki/σ(yi) and ωη,y = [σ(ηi)/σ(yi)]/[ σ(ηj)/σ(yj)] represent the 
weights for the variance of industry shocks (σk
2) and for the correlation of country-specific 
aggregate shocks ρ(ηi,ηj), respectively. The former set of weights, ω )
ki and ω )
kj, are a direct 
function of the shares in total output of the different industries in Home and Foreign countries 
(countries i and j), respectively; whereas the latter set of weights, ωη,y, depend directly on the 
relative volatility of the aggregate shock (with respect to output) in both countries. 
 According to the literature, the impact of greater trade integration on business cycle 
synchronization is theoretically ambiguous. Standard trade theory (Heckscher-Ohlin paradigm) 
predicts that openness to trade would lead to an increasing specialization in production along 
industry lines, and inter-industry patterns of international trade (as typically observed among 
developing countries). If business cycles are dominated by industry-specific shocks,  ξkit, we 
would expect that higher trade integration, by bringing about deeper specialization, would lead to 
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 decreasing business cycle correlations (i.e. given that σk
2 is always positive, we expect a 
negative correlation between ω )
ki and ω )
kj). Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen and Yosha (2001) find 
another mechanism that will render a negative correlation between trade integration and business 
cycle correlations. With higher integration in both international financial markets and goods 
markets, countries should be able to insure against asymmetric shocks through diversification of 
ownership and can afford to have a specialized production structure. In this case, better 
opportunities for income diversification induce higher specialization in production, which are 
associated with more asymmetric business cycles. 
On the other hand, if patterns of specialization in production and international trade are 
dominated by intra-industry trade (as frequently observed among industrial countries), deeper 
trade links will not necessarily result in deeper specialization along industry lines, as predicted 
by standard trade theory. In this case, then, industry specific shocks will not necessarily affect 
different countries more asymmetrically as they become more integrated (see Krugman, 1993). 
In terms of the model, deeper trade integration does not necessarily lead to a negative correlation 
betweenω )
ki and ω )
kj. Consistent with the intra-industry perspective, it has been shown that an 
increasing amount of trade is vertical or fragmented (Hummels, Ishii and Yi, 2001), that is, 
countries are increasingly specializing in particular stages of a good’s production sequence, 
instead of producing the entire good.
3 Kose and Yi (2001) argue that allowing for more of this 
“back-and-forth” trade might lead to a greater response of the business cycle correlations to 
higher trade integration. 
Finally, theoretical advances and empirical evidence supports the existence of different 
channels through which higher integration might have an impact on the correlation between 
country-specific aggregate shocks, ρ(ηi,ηj). First, spillover effects from aggregate demand 
shocks might increase ρ(ηi,ηj). In this case, surges in income in one country might lead to higher 
demand for both foreign and domestic goods. This effect might be even stronger if trade 
integration leads to more coordinated policy shocks (Frankel and Rose, 1998).
4 Second, higher 
trade integration might lead to a more rapid spread of productivity shocks through a more rapid 
diffusion of knowledge and technology (Coe and Helpman, 1995) or via inward FDI and 
                                                 
3 Yi (2001) shows that models of international trade with vertical specialization can explain about 70 percent of 
growth in world trade. 
4 In the presence of fiscal consolidation or more coordinated monetary policies, the impact of spillovers from 
aggregate demand is even larger. 
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 technology sourcing (Lichtenberg and van Pottelsberghe, 1998). Table 1 provides a summary of 
the effects discussed above. 
As we can observe from the table above, the relationship between trade integration and 
business-cycle-synchrony is theoretically ambiguous. While the impact is positive if country-
specific aggregate shocks dominate business cycles, the effect of trade integration is not clear if 
industry-specific shocks are the main source of business cycle. In the latter case, the nature of the 
relationship between trade integration and cyclical output correlations depend on the patterns of 
specialization in production once the economy is open to international markets.  Given the 
observed patterns of specialization in the world economy, we expect a positive correlation 
between trade integration and business cycle correlations among industrial countries, and a more 
ambiguous relationship (i.e., positive and smaller than among industrial countries, and in some 
cases negative) among industrial-developing country pairs and among developing countries. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
 
3.1 The Data 
 
The core of our empirical analysis lies in the measurement of both bilateral trade intensity and 
the bilateral correlations of real economic activity. First, the bilateral intensity of international 


























+ ∑      (5b) 
In equations (5a)-(5b), fijt denotes total bilateral trade flows of (exports to and imports from) 
countries i and j, whereas Fkt represents total trade flows (aggregate exports and imports) of 
country k (with k=i,j). Our two measures of bilateral trade intensity follow Frankel and Rose 
(1997, 1998). In equation (5a), we compute  xm(i,j)τ
1 as the ratio of bilateral trade flows between 
countries i and j divided by the sum of countries i and j’s total trade flows. Our second measure, 
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 xm(i,j)τ
2 in equation (5b),  is the ratio of bilateral trade flows between countries i and j to output 
in both countries (Yit and Yjt, respectively).
5  
The bilateral trade data are taken from the International Monetary Fund’s Direction of 
Trade data set, whereas nominal and real GDP data are taken from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators.  We have annual data for the 1960-99 period on bilateral trade flows for 
the 147 countries in our sample (see Appendix 2 for our list of countries), and we used exports 
FOB and imports CIF in order to construct the measures specified in equations (5a)-(5b).
6 A 
problem that is typical of bilateral trade data is that export flows from country i to country j are 
not necessarily equal to import flows of country j from country i. In this case, we have always 
relied on the data reported by the country with higher income in the country-pair. Since it is not 
clear whether it is more appropriate to build the measures of trade intensity normalizing by trade 
or total output, we conduct our econometric tests using both.  The other key variable in our study 
is the degree of business cycle synchronization between countries i and j at time τ.  To measure 
this variable, we follow Frankel and Rose (1997 and 1998) and compute the correlation between 











=     ( 6 a )    
where y
c is the cyclical component of output (y). Our measure of output (y) is the (log of the) 
real GDP in local currency at constant prices, taken from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators.
7 The cyclical component of output (y
c) is obtained using different de-trending 
techniques, as discussed below. Once we obtain the cyclical component of output for all 
countries, we compute bilateral correlations of real activity. Higher correlations imply a higher 
degree of synchronization. Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997 and 1998) have developed an 
                                                 
5 In addition to these two measures of trade intensity, we also used a theoretical measure of bilateral trade intensity 
derived by Deardorff (1998), in which the bilateral trade is divided by the product of the GDPs, and multiplied by 
the world GDP. For reasons of space, we have not included these results in the present version. They are 
qualitatively similar to the results using our other measures and are available upon request.  
6 Although there was data for imports FOB on the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics, the data availability was more 
limited. That is, it represents at most 20 percent of the coverage with imports CIF.  
7 In addition to output, Frankel and Rose (1997 and 1998) use alternative measures of economic activity, such as 
industrial production, employment, and unemployment. Since these measures are not widely available for the much 
larger sample of countries included in our study, all of our results are based on measures of output correlation. In 
any case, it is reassuring that the results in Frankel and Rose (1997 and 1998) do not seem to be sensitive to the 
measure of economic activity used. 
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 alternative measure of business cycle coherence. They compute an indicator of business cycle 


















                                                
    (6b)   
where y represents output (in logs), and σ(⋅) represents the standard deviation computed over τ 
periods; hence, asymm(yi, yj) is the standard deviation of changes in the log of relative output 




3.2 Empirical Strategy 
 
We have collected annual data for 147 countries over the period 1960-99on both real GDP and 
bilateral trade. After transforming our output data, we compute our measures of business cycle 
synchronization between countries i and j over a given span of time τ. We split our sample into 
four equally sized parts: 1960-69, 1970-79, 1980-89, and 1990-99. In addition, we compute 
averages of our annual bilateral trade intensities over each decade. 
 
3.2.1 The Regression Framework 
 
In order to test the impact of trade integration (approximated by coefficients of bilateral trade 
intensity) on business cycle synchronization (measured by the correlation between cyclical 
outputs), we run the following regression: 
corr(yiτ, yjτ) = µ + γ  ln (1+xm(i,j))τ + u(i,j)τ ,          (6) 
where corr(yiτ, yjτ) denotes the business cycle correlation between country i and country j over 
time period τ, and xm(i,j)τ represents the average bilateral trade intensity between country i and 
country j over the time period τ.
9 Our main interest lies in the sign and the magnitude of the slope 
coefficient γ. If industry shocks are the dominant source of business cycles and openness to trade 
leads to complete specialization (as Heckscher-Ohlin would predict), we would expect γ to be 
 
8 If asymm(yi, yj) = 0, if both countries have analogous cycles. 
9The trade intensity enters the equation in logs, following Frankel and Rose (1997 and 1998). In our large sample of 
147 countries, there are many observations in which trade intensity is zero. Obviously, we would not want to drop 
these observations, since they provide relevant information for the problem at hand. For this reason, we use ln 
(1+f(i,j)) rather than τ ln (f(i,j)), a transformation that would be unnecessary in a sample of industrial countries, in 
which all country pairs have positive trade. 
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 negative. On the other hand, if industry shocks lead to vertical specialization (and, therefore, 
more intra-industry trade), or if global shocks dominate economic fluctuations then we would 
expect γ to be positive. 
A problem with equation (6) is that, as discussed earlier, trade intensity itself may be 
endogenous. Higher output correlation could encourage countries to become members of a 
currency union, which in turn could lead to increased trade intensity (Frankel and Rose, 1998 
and 2002; Rose and Engel, 2002). Alternatively, both of our variables of interest, namely output 
correlation and trade intensity, could be explained by a third one, such as currency union, which 
at the same time reduces transactions costs in trade flows and links the macroeconomic policies 
of their members. Hence, countries joining a currency union might exhibit a positive correlation 
between trade integration and business cycle synchronization. In this context, running an OLS 
regression for equation (6) would yield biased and inconsistent estimates for γ.  Given the 
problems mentioned above, we need instruments for the bilateral trade intensity in order to 
estimate γ consistently. We use the gravity model of bilateral trade to motivate our choice of 
instrumental variables. Following Wei (1996) and Deardorff (1998), the regression for bilateral 
trade we use is: 
ln (1+xmij) ≈ xm(i,j) = β0 + β1 ln yi +  β2 ln yj +β3 ln dij 
+ β4 ln Bij + β5 ln REMi + β5 ln REMj + Z’γ+ εij    (7) 
where fij is our measures of bilateral trade flows country i to country j, yi and yj represent  initial 
output (real GDP) in countries i and j, dij is the distance between countries i and j (in logs), and 
Bij is a dummy variable equal to one for countries that share a common border.  We expect that 
bilateral trade between countries i and j will increase if their outputs increase, if they are closer in 
distance, and if they share a common border. Furthermore, we include an indicator of 
geographical remoteness for countries i and j that measures how far each country lies from 
alternative trading partners.
10 
Finally, the matrix Z comprises other variables that are used in the empirical literature of 
the gravity equation model of trade. Here, we additionally control for initial population and area 
                                                 
10 Presumably, trade intensity would increase the farther the countries in the pair are to alternative markets. 
Following Wei (1996) and Deardorff (1998), we construct a formula for the remoteness of country i as the weighted 
average of that country’s distances to all of its trading partners (except for the country j involved in a determined 
country pair), using as weights the share of the partner’s output in world GDP. That is, for a determined (i,j)-
country-pair, the that this measure complies with several desirable properties for a measure of remoteness. 
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 in countries i and j, number of islands and landlocked countries in the (i,j) country pair, a dummy 
variable for countries with regional free trade agreements, and dummies for common 




3.2.2 Robustness Checks 
 
In order to check the robustness of γ, we first evaluate the sensitivity of our parameter of interest 
to changes in the de-trending technique used to compute business cycles and, second, we analyze 
the sensitivity of γ to the inclusion of additional controls. 
Different business cycle filters. Our first step to check for the robustness of our results 
will be to check the sensitivity of γ to changes in the cyclical component used in order to 
compute the business cycle correlations. For that reason and given the lack of consensus about 
optimal de-trending techniques, we use four different procedures to decompose output into trend 
and cycle: (a) quadratic trend model, (b) first-differences, (c) the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter, 
and (d) the Band-Pass filter (Baxter and King, 1999).  In addition, we use the index of business 
cycle asymmetries used by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997 and 1998), which we discussed 
above. Our preferred de-trending technique for the discussion of our results is the band-pass 
filter proposed by Baxter and King (1999). Unlike other trend-cycle decomposition techniques, 
this filter takes into account the statistical features of the business cycle.
12  In accordance with 
these statistical properties, Baxter and King showed that the desired filter is a band-pass filter, 
that is, a filter that passes through components of the time series with periodic fluctuations 
between 6 and 32 quarters, while removing components at higher and lower frequencies.
13 While 
much of the discussion will be based on the results using this de-trending technique, the results 
that we will present in Sections 4 and 5 are robust to any of the four trend-cycle decomposition 
techniques used in this paper.  
                                                 
11 The specification of our gravity equation model follows Rose and Engel (2002). 
12 The NBER chronology lists 30 complete cycles since 1858. The shortest full cycle (peak to peak) was 6 quarters, 
and the longest 39 quarters, with 90 percent of these cycles being no longer than 32 quarters (Stock and Watson, 
1999). 
13 Baxter and King (1999) argue that the ideal band-pass filter is a moving average process with infinite order. Due 
to practical reasons, we must approximate this filter with finite moving averages. They specifically recommend the 
use of a 7-year centered moving average when working with both quarterly and annual time series data.  Finally, 
note that although we used the band-pass filter as our preferred de-trending technique, the results that we will 
present in Sections 4 and 5 are robust to any of the four trend-cycle decomposition techniques used in this paper.  
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 Additional Controls. We also test the robustness of γ to the inclusion of possible omitted 
variables that could help explain business cycle synchronization. Similarities in the structure of 
production imply that industry-specific shocks tend to have similar effects on aggregate 
fluctuations across national borders. Evidence shows that these shocks will generate higher 
degree of business cycle synchronization among regions with similar production structures rather 
than among regions with asymmetric structures (Imbs, 1999; Loayza, López, and Ubide, 1999). 
Similarities in the structure of production are approximated using the absolute value index 
suggested by Krugman (1991). Letting sk,i and sk,j denote the GDP shares for industry k in 
countries i and j (k=1, 2, ...,N), the similarity of country j’s and country k’s production structures 
is measured as ∑ . Note that the higher is the value of this index, the greater is the 
difference in industry shares across countries i and j and, therefore, the greater are the differences 
in economic structure. Given that industry specialization may affect business cycle 
synchronization through different mechanisms, we measure specialization using the 9-sector 





kj ki s s
1
14 Data for the construction of these indices was 
obtained from the World Bank and UNIDO.
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4. Empirical Assessment 
 
In this section, we present our empirical assessment on the relationship between trade integration 
and business cycle synchronization for the sample of all country pairs. As we stated in Section 3, 
we have annual data on output and bilateral trade for 147 countries over the 1960-99 period. In 
order to measure our dependent variable (business cycle correlation), we compute the business 
cycle of real GDP over our sample period using different de-trending techniques (i.e., log-linear, 
first differences, Hodrick-Prescott, and band-pass filter). Then, we compute the business cycle 
correlation between countries i and j over a given span of time. In this case, we split the 1960-99 
period into four equally-sized sub-periods, and we are able to compute a total of 33,676 bilateral 
                                                 
14 In the 1-digit level ISIC code we find the following sectors: (i) Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry, and Fishing; (ii) 
Mining and Quarrying; (iii) Manufacturing; (iv) Electricity, Gas, and Water; (v) Construction; (vi) Wholesale and 
Retail Trade; (vii) Transport, Storage and Communication; (viii) Finance, Insurance, Real Estate, and Business 
Services, (ix) Community, Social, and Personal Services. 
15 Alternatively, we also used a 3-sector version of this index, discriminating between agriculture, industry and 
services. While it is a much more rough indicator of production asymmetries, it is available for a somewhat larger 
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 output correlations: 6,232 for the 1960s, 7,753 for the 1970s, 10,127 for the 1980s, and 9,564 for 
the 1990s). Likewise, our annual data on bilateral trade intensity is averaged over each decade to 
be compatible with our regression framework.
16 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
In Table 2 we present some descriptive statistics on cyclical output correlation as well as the 
index of business cycle asymmetries for all country pairs, and the evolution of these average 
correlations over time. Before stating our results, we should observe that the degree of 
association between output correlations obtained with the quadratic trend and the correlations 
obtained with other filters is smaller than the degree of association among the latter ones.
17 On 
the other hand, business cycle correlations obtained with first-difference, Hodrick-Prescott, and 
band-pass filters are highly correlated among them, with their degree of association fluctuating 
between 0.77 and 0.94. Finally, we find that our index of business cycle asymmetries is 
negatively associated with our different measures of cyclical output correlation (as expected), 
with the correlation coefficient fluctuating between –0.13 (quadratic trend) and –0.25 (first 
differences). 
On average, the measure of business cycle synchronization for all country pairs over the 
1960-99 period (“pooled” correlation) fluctuates between 0.0372 (using first differences) and 
0.065 (using the quadratic trend filter), with this correlation measure being weaker in the 1960s 
(around 0.0084 and 0.0234) and stronger in the 1990s (around 0.039 and 0.102).  
In Table 3, we present the average business cycle synchronization across different groups 
of country pairs. We find that the highest cyclical output correlation is exhibited by the pairs of 
industrial countries, (IND,IND), with an average that fluctuates around 0.2255 (using first 
differences) and 0.2604 (using the quadratic trend filter).  On the other hand, output correlations 
for country pairs of developing countries, (DEV,DEV), are quite small and they fluctuate around 
0.0203 (using first differences) and 0.0547 (using the quadratic trend filter). Furthermore, we 
                                                                                                                                                             
sample (25,632 vs. 20,131 observations). The results using this alternative index are basically unchanged, and for 
this reason we do not report them.  
16 In addition to our pooled data analysis, we also conducted our regression analysis in a purely cross-sectional 
dimension. That is, we compute the business cycle correlations for countries i and j over the whole sample period, 
and we averaged the annual bilateral trade data over the 1960-99 period. That is, we have one observation per 
country pair (instead of four). The results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the results presented here, 
and are available from the authors upon request. 
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 find that the output correlation among mixed industrial-developing country pairs, (IND,DEV), 
are larger than the correlations for (DEV,DEV) pairs. These correlations fluctuate around 0.0581 
(using first differences) and 0.0862 (using HP filter). From these observations, we can see that 
both North-North and North-South cycles are more synchronized than South-South cycles 
regardless of the de-trending technique used (see Table 3).
18 
Finally, we find that (IND,IND)-country-pairs have higher bilateral trade intensity  (0.35) 
than the one exhibited by (IND,DEV) and (DEV,DEV) country pairs (0.04 for both groups of 
country pairs) if we use the bilateral trade intensity as a percentage of the country-pair’s real 




4.2 Correlation Analysis 
 
Before conducting our regression analysis, we present the correlation analysis between output 
correlation and bilateral trade intensity for the sample of all country pairs and different sub-
samples of country pairs. This provides a rough first look at the link between our main variables 
of interest (see Table 4).  In the first panel of Table 4, we show the simple correlation between 
trade intensity and cyclical output correlation. For the whole sample of country pairs, we find a 
positive and significant relationship between our two variables of interest. This positive 
relationship is robust to changes in the measures of bilateral trade intensity and to changes in the 
de-trending procedure to compute cyclical components. Whether we normalize by output or total 
trade, we find that this correlation fluctuates between 0.047 and 0.089 across the different de-
trending techniques. As expected, we also find that our index of cycle asymmetries is inversely 
related to bilateral trade intensity, with their correlation fluctuating from –0.063 to –0.097.  
In the second panel of Table 4, we compute the correlation between bilateral trade 
intensity and business cycle synchronization conditional on geographical factors and income 
measures (i.e., national borders, distance and remoteness, number of islands and landlocked 
countries, common geographical region, common language, common main trading partner, 
                                                                                                                                                             
17 The degree of between the quadratic trend correlations and the other filters fluctuates between 0.37 and 0.41. 
18 These results are corroborated by our index of cycle asymmetries, with the group of industrial countries showing a 
more symmetric behavior than developing countries, while mixed country-pairs are somewhere in between.  
19 These sample statistics are not reported but available from the authors upon request. 
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 colony, dummy for regional free trade agreements, output, area, and population).
20 We find that 
the conditional correlations are not only positive and significant but also higher than the simple 
correlations. The correlation between output correlation and bilateral trade intensity (as a 
percentage of either total trade or GDP) fluctuates around 0.11, whereas the correlation between 
the index of cyclical asymmetries and trade intensity fluctuates from –0.1598 and –0.2063. 
In Table 4, we also present the correlation analysis between cycle synchronization and 
trade intensity for different groups of country pairs. We generally find that (IND, IND) country 
pairs display the highest correlation between trade intensity and cycle synchronization among the 
different groups of country pairs, with a conditional correlation that fluctuates between 0.191 and 
0.268.  The co-movement between our two variables of interest for (DEV, DEV) country pairs is 
also positive and significant (with the conditional correlation fluctuating from 0.067 and 0.085), 
while that for (IND, DEV) fluctuates within the range (-0.0045, 0.0657). This first look at the 
evidence provides support to the hypothesis that the link between trade intensity and cycle 
correlation is stronger among industrial countries. We do find, however, that such a link is 
positive and significant for every country pair grouping we have considered. 
 
4.3 Regression Analysis 
 
We begin by presenting the estimates for our parameter of interest γ in equation (6) for our 
sample of all country pairs (Table 6). We then check whether the results are different for 
different country pair groups (Tables 7 and 8), as well as across time (Table 9). In the discussion 
of the results, we will focus mostly on the estimates using the band-pass filter, although our main 
results are robust to the use of other de-trending techniques.  
 
4.3.1 All Country-Pairs 
We run our regression equation (6) for different measures of our dependent variable (i.e., 
cyclical output correlation and index of cyclical asymmetries) and measures of bilateral trade 
normalized by total trade and output for all country pairs.
21 Our OLS estimates of the coefficient 
                                                 
20 This implies the calculation of a partial correlation between trade integration and business cycle synchronization, 
after taking into account geographical features and output levels that could affect both bilateral trade and output 
correlation. 
21 Our regressions include time dummies for the 1970-79, 1980-89 and 1990-99 periods, with the constant 
representing the 1960-69 period (base category). Although the estimates for the time dummies are not reported, they 
are jointly significant in the majority of cases.  
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 γ in equation (6) are biased and inconsistent due to the endogeneity of bilateral trade. Hence, we 
need to find instruments for bilateral trade in order to estimate our coefficient of interest more 
efficiently. We take advantage of the vast literature on the gravity equation of international trade 
in order to choose our set of instruments for the bilateral trade intensity (Frankel and Romer, 
1999; Rose, 2000)  
According to the literature, bilateral trade intensity between countries i and j is 
instrumented with the following variables: distance between countries i and j, remoteness of 
countries i and j, output, population, and area of both countries, dummy variables for common 
border, common geographical region, common language, colony, common main trading partner, 
dummy for regional free trade agreement, number of islands in the (i,j) country pair, and number 
of landlocked countries in the (i,j) country pair. Except for the dummy variables, the 
determinants are expressed in logs.  
Our results for the gravity equation model of trade (i.e., first stage regressions) are 
presented in Table 5. In general, we find that countries that share a common border, that are 
closer in distance and have trading partners that are farther away from the rest of the world, are 
members of the same region, speak the same language, have the same colonial origin and the 
same common main trading partner, higher GDP, smaller population, and engage in regional free 
trade agreements, trade more intensively. 
In Table 6 we present our OLS and IV estimates of equation (6) for the sample of all 
country pairs. There we present our basic bivariate model (i.e. model M0), and the model M1, 
which is the basic model that includes the asymmetries in economic structures as an additional 
explanatory variable. Our OLS estimates show a positive and significant association between 
bilateral trade intensity and output correlation, which is robust to changes in the measure of the 
trade integration and the de-trending technique used to compute the cyclical fluctuations of 
output (see panel I of Table 6).
22  Regarding the magnitude of the effect, using our estimates for 
the band-pass filtered output correlations and the augmented model M1, we obtain that a surge in 
bilateral trade of one standard deviation starting from the mean would be associated with a 
                                                 
22 As expected, when we use the business cycle asymmetry index, the sign is reversed. 
  20 
 increase in the output correlation from an average of 0.05 to 0.0884 (if bilateral trade is 
normalized by total trade) and 0.0777 (if normalized by output).
23 
In panel II of Table 6, we present our IV estimates for the impact of trade integration on 
output correlation. Our coefficient of interest is also positive and significant, thus suggesting that 
higher bilateral trade intensity generates more synchronized business cycles. However, unlike the 
OLS results, the impact of trade intensity appears somewhat larger in magnitude. An increase in 
the bilateral trade intensity of one standard deviation starting from the sample mean would 
increase the (band-pass filtered) bilateral output correlation from 0.05 to 0.086 (if normalized by 
total trade) and to 0.088 (if normalized by output).
24 Meanwhile, asymmetries in economic 
structure across countries have the expected negative sign with cyclical output correlation (and 
positive with cyclical asymmetries) although it is significant in some specifications. This implies 
that countries tend to respond similarly to productivity shocks or shocks to the composition of 
import demand from other countries if they have similar structures of production, and therefore, 
they tend to exhibit higher cyclical output correlation. 
While our results suggest that the impact of trade intensity is positive and significant, it is 
much smaller than in Frankel and Rose (1998), who find that a one standard deviation increase in 
bilateral trade intensity raises cycle correlation from 0.22 to 0.35. This suggests that the impact 
may be smaller in the case of developing or mixed country pairs, which were absent in the 
Frankel and Rose paper. Next, we investigate whether the effects are different for different types 
of country pairs.  
 
4.3.2 Industrial Countries (IND) vs. Developing Countries (DEV) 
In Table 7 and 8, we present a set of regressions in which the bilateral trade intensity is 
interacted with slope dummies corresponding to country pairs of industrial countries, (IND,IND), 
country pairs of developing countries (DEV,DEV), and mixed pairs of industrial and developing 
                                                 
23 The final correlation reported is equal to the mean of the band-pass filtered output correlation (0.0501) plus the 
coefficient estimated multiplied by the standard deviation of the bilateral trade intensity measure. That is, 
0.0501+10.1942*0.0038=0.0884 (when normalized by trade) and 0.0501+12.1055*0.0023=0.0777. Note that 
10.1942 and 12.1055 represent the estimated OLS coefficients from model M1 in Table 5, when using band-pass 
filtered output correlations. In addition, 0.0038 and 0.0023 are the standard deviations of bilateral trade intensity 
when normalized by trade and output, respectively. 
24 Using the IV estimated coefficient from the model M1 when the dependent variable is the (band-pass filtered) 
output correlations, cyclical synchrony jumps from 0.0501 on average to 0.0501+14.7555*0.0024=0.086 (when 
normalized by trade) and to 0.0501+29.6755*0.0013=0.088 (when normalized by output). 
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 countries (IND,DEV). Therefore, we can obtain separate coefficients for trade intensity for each 
one of the country-pair groupings. Results for our basic model are presented in Table 7, whereas 
OLS and IV estimates for the augmented model (which includes asymmetries in economic 
structures) are reported in Table 8. 
Based on the estimates reported in Tables 7 and 8, we find that the impact of trade 
intensity on output correlation is larger among industrial country-pairs (North-North) than 
among any other group of country pairs. Also, the impact is smaller among developing country-
pairs (South-South), than among the other groups in most cases. Using our IV estimates of model 
M1 (which includes the 9-sector index of asymmetric economic structures) with the dependent 
variable being the (band-pass filtered) output correlations, we find that one standard deviation 
increase in the measure of bilateral trade intensity from the mean will generate an increase in 
output correlation: 
•  From 0.25 to 0.373 (0.359) when normalized by output (trade) among 
industrial countries using the basic model (M0), and to 0.399 (0.381) when 
normalized by output (trade) among industrial countries using the augmented 
model (M1). 
•  From 0.075 to 0.104 (0.097) when normalized by output (trade) among mixed 
industrial-developing country pairs using the basic model (M0), and to 0.1043 
(0.0957) when normalized by output (trade) among industrial countries using 
the augmented model (M1). 
•  From 0.031 to 0.0523 (0.053) when normalized by output (trade) among 
industrial countries using the basic model (M0), and to 0.0588 (0.0579) when 
normalized by output (trade) among industrial countries using the augmented 
model (M1). 
 
From these results there are two important implications relative to previous studies. First, 
our finding for industrial countries is very similar to the results in Frankel and Rose (1998). 
Using a more restricted sample (21 industrial countries), with different frequency of information 
(quarterly data for the 1959-1993 period), they find that a one standard deviation increase in 
bilateral trade intensity would raise the bilateral correlation of cross-country GDP (de-trended by 
differencing) from 0.22 to 0.35, a result that is almost identical to ours. Second, our regression 
results confirm our priors: The impact of trade integration among developing countries is still 
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 positive and significant, and significantly smaller than the impact of trade intensity on the output 
correlation among industrial countries. Finally, using the HP and BP filters, the impact of trade 
intensity on output correlation is larger in mixed industrial-developing country pairs than among 
developing countries, which suggest that North-South free trade agreements may enhance 
cyclical output correlation in a better way than South-South agreements. 
 
4.3.4 The Impact of Trade Integration over Time 
The magnitude of the impact of trade integration on business cycle synchronization may have 
varied over time, depending on the nature, size and type of disturbances that have affected the 
world economy.
25  In this section, we assess whether the impact of trade on business cycle 
synchronization has varied over the decades spanning the 1960-99 period. From the results 
reported in Tables 9 and 10, we might argue that the impact of trade is negligible during the 
1960s in the majority of cases, whereas it is statistically significant for the other decades. Based 
on our estimates with HP- and band-pass-filtered output correlations, we find that the greatest 
impact of trade occurs in the 1970s and in the 1990s, when the world economy faced several 
global/regional shocks. Using the IV coefficients for trade integration (normalized by output) in 
the model M1 (that includes the 9-sector index of asymmetries in economic structures), we find 
that the impact of trade integration is negative and not significant for the 1960s, whereas the 
impact seems to be positive and significant for the other decades (see panel II in Table 10).   
An economic interpretation of these results will imply that following a one standard 
deviation increase in bilateral trade (normalized by output) during the decade, cyclical output 
correlation during the 1960s (from 0.0234 vs. 0.0368), and that it will significantly increase for 
the rest of the decades from 0.0522 to 0.0992 in the 1970s, from 0.0588 to 0.0885 in the 1980s, 
and from 0.0567 to 0.1309 in the 1990s. One potential explanation for this may be the increased 




                                                 
25 Cyclical output co-movement among industrial countries and between industrial and developing countries has 
varied over time as a product of idiosyncratic shocks in countries belonging to these regions. Specifically, declining 
co-movement in the 1990s has been attributed to asymmetric shocks in the major advanced economies (e.g., German 
reunification and Japan’s long recession), and a series of emerging market crises, especially in Asia and Latin 
America (IMF, 2001). 
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 4.3.5. Trade Integration and Production Structure Asymmetries 
 
In Table 11, we include the index of production asymmetries as a control variable. However, 
similarities in the production structure may affect the nature of the impact of trade integration on 
cycle correlation, since similar economies are more prone to show a pattern of intra-industry 
specialization. These considerations suggest the convenience of adding an interactive term, in 
order to look at complementarities between production asymmetries and trade intensity. We 
expect this interaction term to be negative and significant, suggesting that the impact of trade 
integration should be weaker among dissimilar countries.  
We find evidence consistent with our prior, that is, we find a negative and statistically 
significant interaction effect between trade intensity and asymmetries in production. Moreover, 
this negative coefficient is robust to the bilateral trade measure, the de-trending technique and 
the estimation method (OLS or IV). See Table 11 for more detailed information. In Figure 1 we 
observe the change in output correlation following a one standard deviation increase in bilateral 
trade intensity. In this case, note that the impact of trade will be influenced by the asymmetries in 
production structure existent between a specific pair of countries. We find that the higher the 
extent of the asymmetries, the lower the change in output correlation following the positive trade 
shock. For example, the mixed industrial-developing country pairs exhibit asymmetries in 
production structures that are larger than the one for all country pairs (0.4456 vs. 0.3994) and the 
response of cyclical output correlation is lower than the world average (1.7 vs. 3.0). Furthermore, 
on average, industrial countries exhibit the most similar production structures (with a value for 
our index equal to 0.1331) and, hence, the largest change in output correlation (8.1). 
 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
 
One of the key criteria in the optimal currency area (OCA) literature is that countries should join 
a currency union if they have closer international trade links and more symmetric business 
cycles. However, both criteria (trade intensity and cycle correlation) are endogenous.  After 
controlling for endogeneity, we want to know whether trade intensity increases cycle correlation 
in a more expanded set of countries. Although Frankel and Rose (1998) find that trade intensity 
increases cycle correlation among industrial countries, there are reasons to believe that this could 
be different among developing countries and among industrial-developing country pairs. Patterns 
of international trade among industrial countries (i.e., intra-industry trade) are quite different 
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 than the patterns followed among developing countries and among industrial-developing country 
pairs (i.e., inter-industry trade) suggesting that, in these cases, the impact of trade intensity on 
cycle correlation should be weaker, and of ambiguous sign. 
In this paper we have attempted to provide an exhaustive analysis of the impact of trade 
integration on business cycle synchronization. Not only do we provide an efficient estimate for 
this effect (thanks to the use of the gravity equation for international trade), but we also conduct 
a sensitivity analysis to changes in the sample of countries, changes in the time period of the 
estimation, and the inclusion of interaction effects between trade intensity and direct sectoral 
linkages. Our prior is that trade intensity should have a positive effect on cyclical output 
correlation among industrial countries, and a smaller effect among other country pairs. After 
performing our regression analysis, we find the following:  
First, countries that have close trade linkages would exhibit higher output co-movement. 
This result is robust to changes in our measures of bilateral trade and cyclical output, as well as 
the estimation method chosen. An economic interpretation of this result yields an increase in 
business cycle correlations from 0.05 to 0.09 if the bilateral trade intensity increases by one 
standard deviation. Second, the impact of trade integration on output fluctuations among 
industrial countries is higher than the impact among developing countries and the impact for 
industrial-developing country pairs. Also, we find that the impact of trade integration on business 
cycle synchronization is potentially higher in North-South cycles than in South-South cycles. An 
analogous result holds when we compare Industrial and Latin American countries. Third, a one 
standard deviation increase in bilateral trade intensity would raise cyclical output correlation 
from 0.25 to 0.381 (when normalized by trade) and 0.3985 (when normalized by output) among 
industrial countries. Note that although we use a different sample of countries, a slightly different 
time period and a different frequency of information, we obtain qualitatively similar results to 
Frankel and Rose (1998). On the other hand, the same increase in bilateral trade (when 
normalized by output) would lead to a surge in output correlation from 0.075 to 0.1043 for the 
industrial-developing country pairs, and from 0.031 to 0.0588 among developing countries. 
Fourth, we find that the impact of trade integration on business cycle has markedly changed over 
time. After being not significant in the 1960s, it became positive and large in the 1970s and 
1990s. The greater impact of trade in these decades could be attributed to the occurrence of 
several global / regional shocks to the world economy. Finally, we find robust evidence of 
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 interaction effects between trade intensity and asymmetries in the economic structures across 
countries. After we take into account for these asymmetries, we find that a one standard 
deviation increase in bilateral trade (normalized by output) would raise output correlations from 
0.05 to 0.08. A similar shock would increase the output correlation from 0.25 to 0.33 among 
industrial countries and from 0.03 to 0.06 among developing countries. 
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 Table 1. Effects of Integration on Trade 
 
Type of Shocks  Impact on ρy,y*  References 
(-): specialization in production 
through removal of tariff barriers. 
(-): specialization in production 
through better opportunities for 
income diversification. 
Frankel and Rose (1998). 
 
Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen
and Yosha (2001). 
, 
Industry Shocks 
(-/+): Intra-industry Trade as main 
mechanism. 
(-/+): Vertical Specialization. 
Krugman (1993) 
 
Kose and Yi (2001) 
Aggregate  Shocks  (+): Spillover effects from aggregate 
demand shocks. 
(+): Transmission of knowledge and 
technology diffusion. 
Frankel and Rose (1998). 
 
Coe and Helpman (1995). 
Lichtengerg et al. (1998). 
   
 
Table 2.  Sample Statistics, 1960-99: Cycle Correlation over Time  
Sample of ALL country pairs 
 
Filter 1960-99 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99
Quadratic Trend (QT) 0.0648 0.0084 0.0349 0.0872 0.1022
(0.56)         (0.57)         (0.54)         (0.54)         (0.58)        
First Differences (1D) 0.0372 0.0170 0.0465 0.0406 0.0391
(0.37)         (0.37)         (0.37)         (0.37)         (0.38)        
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) 0.0590 0.0191 0.0608 0.0713 0.0704
(0.39)         (0.37)         (0.39)         (0.39)         (0.40)        
Band-Pass (BP) 0.0501 0.0234 0.0522 0.0588 0.0567
(0.38)         (0.38)         (0.38)         (0.38)         (0.38)        
Index of Asymmetries 0.0671 0.0625 0.0751 0.0683 0.0620
(IA) (0.04)         (0.04)         (0.05)         (0.04)         (0.05)        
 
Note: Numbers in parenthesis represent the standard deviation of thecycle correlation. 
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     Table 3.  Sample Statistics, 1960-99: Cycle Correlation over Time 
    (Sub-samples of Country Pairs) 
   Note: Numbers in parenthesis represent the standard deviation of the cycle correlation. (IND,IND) 
represent country pairs of industrial countries, (DEV,DEV) are country pairs of developing 
countries, whereas (IND,DEV) represent mixed country pairs of industrial and developing 
countries. 
Filter All (IND,IND) (IND,DEV) (DEV,DEV)
Quadratic Trend (QT) 0.0648 0.2604 0.0689 0.0547
(0.56)         (0.56)             (0.56)             (0.56)            
First Differences (1D) 0.0372 0.2255 0.0581 0.0203
(0.37)         (0.39)             (0.37)             (0.37)            
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) 0.0590 0.2522 0.0862 0.0393
(0.39)         (0.39)             (0.39)             (0.38)            
Band-Pass (BP) 0.0501 0.2538 0.0750 0.0310
(0.38)         (0.37)             (0.38)             (0.37)            
Index of Asymmetries 0.0671 0.0288 0.0549 0.0737
(IA) (0.04)         (0.01)             (0.04)             (0.04)            
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 Table 4. Correlation Analysis: Cycle Correlation (CC) and Bilateral Trade Intensity (BTI) 
      (Sub-samples of Country Pairs, 1960-99) 
 
Trade Intensity        All Country Pairs   (IND,IND) Country Pairs   (IND,DEV) Country Pairs  (DEV,DEV) Country Pairs
Filter Normalized by: Coeff. (p-value) Coeff. (p-value) Coeff. (p-value) Coeff. (p-value)
I. Unconditional Panel Correlations
Quadratic Trend (QT) Total Trade: 0.0500 (0.000)              0.0484 (0.178)              -0.0129 (0.254)              0.0576 (0.000)             
Output: 0.0472 (0.000)              0.0985 (0.005)              -0.0144 (0.184)              0.0435 (0.000)             
First Differences (1D) Total Trade: 0.0838 (0.000)              0.1351 (0.000)              0.0301 (0.008)              0.0743 (0.000)             
Output: 0.0870 (0.000)              0.2018 (0.000)              0.0199 (0.067)              0.0762 (0.000)             
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) Total Trade: 0.0829 (0.000)              0.1222 (0.001)              0.0293 (0.010)              0.0702 (0.000)             
Output: 0.0841 (0.000)              0.1748 (0.000)              0.0364 (0.001)              0.0702 (0.000)             
Band-Pass (BP) Total Trade: 0.0885 (0.000)              0.1374 (0.000)              0.0357 (0.002)              0.0717 (0.000)             
Output: 0.0885 (0.000)              0.1841 (0.000)              0.0381 (0.000)              0.0736 (0.000)             
Index of Asymmetries Total Trade: -0.0973 (0.000)              -0.0508 (0.157)              -0.0371 (0.001)              -0.0468 (0.000)             
(IA) Output: -0.0634 (0.000)              -0.0802 (0.022)              -0.0146 (0.178)              -0.0304 (0.000)             
II. Conditional Panel Correlations  1/
Quadratic Trend (QT) Total Trade: 0.0949 (0.000)              0.1909 (0.000)              -0.0045 (0.738)              0.0851 (0.000)             
Output: 0.0889 (0.000)              0.2115 (0.000)              0.0103 (0.429)              0.0733 (0.000)             
First Differences (1D) Total Trade: 0.1091 (0.000)              0.2549 (0.000)              0.0073 (0.588)              0.0778 (0.000)             
Output: 0.1092 (0.000)              0.2680 (0.000)              0.0299 (0.022)              0.0762 (0.000)             
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) Total Trade: 0.1098 (0.000)              0.2085 (0.000)              0.0347 (0.010)              0.0672 (0.000)             
Output: 0.1126 (0.000)              0.2154 (0.000)              0.0656 (0.000)              0.0703 (0.000)             
Band-Pass (BP) Total Trade: 0.1170 (0.000)              0.2051 (0.000)              0.0390 (0.004)              0.0734 (0.000)             
Output: 0.1173 (0.000)              0.2111 (0.000)              0.0657 (0.000)              0.0742 (0.000)             
Index of Asymmetries Total Trade: -0.2063 (0.000)              -0.1174 (0.003)              -0.1501 (0.000)              -0.1223 (0.000)             
(IA) Output: -0.1598 (0.000)              -0.1354 (0.000)              -0.1073 (0.000)              -0.0935 (0.000)             
 
1/ Among the instruments we have the distance between the countries i and j, common border, remoteness of countries i and j in the pair, output, 
population, and area in both countries, number of islands and landlocked countries in the pair, dummies for countries with common geographical 
region, common language, common colonial origin, and common “main trading partner.” 
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Table 5. Determinants of Bilateral Trade Intensity: First Stage Regressions 
Dependent Variable: Bilateral Trade Intensity between countries i and j 
Normalized by trade or output and expressed as log (1+ ratio)   
 
            Bilateral Trade             Bilateral Trade
Variable      Normalized by Trade      Normalized by Output
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
Constant -0.0856 (0.0044)               ** -0.0495 (0.0044)               **
Distance (in logs) -0.0007 (0.0001)               ** -0.0008 (0.0001)               **
Border Dummy 0.0059 (0.0007)               ** 0.0020 (0.0003)               **
Remoteness Country i 0.0004 (0.0002)               * 0.0006 (0.0002)               **
Remoteness Country j 0.0001 (0.0002)               0.0009 (0.0002)               **
GDP Country i (logs) 0.0173 (0.0008)               ** 0.0101 (0.0006)               **
GDP Country j (logs) 0.0160 (0.0007)               ** 0.0085 (0.0005)               **
Population Country i (logs) -0.0030 (0.0005)               ** -0.0015 (0.0003)               **
Population Country j (logs) -0.0030 (0.0006)               ** -0.0018 (0.0003)               **
Area Country i (logs) -0.0004 (0.0003)               -0.0017 (0.0003)               **
Area Country j (logs) 0.0002 (0.0002)               -0.0007 (0.0002)               **
Free Trade Agreement Dummy 0.0047 (0.0005)               ** 0.0027 (0.0003)               **
# Islands (i,j) 0.0006 (0.0001)               ** 0.0000 (0.0000)              
# Landlocked Countries (i,j) -0.0001 (0.0000)               ** 0.0000 (0.0000)              
Common Region 0.0007 (0.0001)               ** 0.0001 (0.0001)              
Common Language 0.0004 (0.0001)               ** 0.0002 (0.0001)               **
Common Colonial Origin 0.0002 (0.0001)               * -0.0001 (0.0001)               *




Note: * (**) implies that the variable is significant at the 10 (5) percent level. 
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 Table 6. Regression Analysis: Cycle Correlation (CC) and Bilateral Trade Intensity (BTI) 
Sample of All Country Pairs, 1960-99 
 
Basic Model (M0) Augmented Model (M1)
Bilateral Trade Normalized Bilateral Trade Normalized
Filter by Trade by Output by Trade by Output
I. Ordinary Least Squares
Quadratic Trend (QT) 7.4428 ** 10.9157 ** 8.6083 ** 9.5249 **
(1.30)                   (1.57)                   (1.51)                   (1.71)                  
First Differences (1D) 8.1436 ** 13.7523 ** 9.9164 ** 12.2181 **
(0.90)                   (1.45)                   (1.16)                   (1.58)                  
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) 8.4923 ** 13.8045 ** 10.0101 ** 11.7272 **
(0.93)                   (1.51)                   (1.22)                   (1.56)                  
Band-Pass (BP) 8.8118 ** 14.2272 ** 10.1942 ** 12.1055 **
(0.94)                   (1.54)                   (1.21)                   (1.60)                  
Index of Asymmetries -0.9587 ** -1.0999 ** -0.8159 ** -0.7529 **
(IA) (0.08)                   (0.15)                   (0.09)                   (0.12)                  
II. Instrumental Variables
Quadratic Trend (QT) 19.2248 ** 32.9861 ** 18.0929 ** 32.7439 **
(1.79)                   (3.36)                   (2.44)                   (4.63)                  
First Differences (1D) 16.1849 ** 30.6538 ** 13.5473 ** 27.7425 **
(1.26)                   (2.37)                   (1.68)                   (3.20)                  
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) 16.5784              ** 31.8238              ** 14.1747              ** 29.5442              **
(1.33)                   (2.48)                   (1.79)                   (3.38)                  
Band-Pass (BP) 17.5990              ** 33.3613              ** 14.7544              ** 29.6755              **
(1.31)                   (2.45)                   (1.75)                   (3.32)                  
Index of Asymmetries -3.0618 ** -4.7125 ** -2.1143 ** -3.3359 **
(IA) (0.11)                   (0.22)                   (0.16)                   (0.30)                  
 
Notes: The numbers in parenthesis are the standard errors of the estimated coefficients. 
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Table 7. Regression Analysis: Cycle Correlation (CC) and Bilateral Trade Intensity (BTI) 
Different Sub-Samples of Country Pairs, 1960-99 
 Basic Model (M0) 
Trade Intensity  (IND,IND) Country Pairs  (IND,DEV) Country Pairs (DEV,DEV) Country Pairs
Filter Normalized by: Coeff. Std. Dev. Coeff. Std. Dev. Coeff. Std. Dev.
I. Ordinary Least Squares
Quadratic Trend (QT) Total Trade: 7.5665 (2.114)         ** 11.8804 (2.768)         ** 6.4435 (2.220)         **
Output: 18.7573 (3.292)         ** 34.5847 (6.316)         ** 8.3603 (1.884)         **
First Differences (1D) Total Trade: 8.2827 (1.441)         ** 6.3717 (1.517)         ** 8.8664 (1.320)         **
Output: 22.4093 (2.859)         ** 14.2492 (3.935)         ** 10.5755 (1.323)         **
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) Total Trade: 8.8427 (1.493)         ** 7.7693 (1.628)         ** 8.2792 (1.333)         **
Output: 22.7710 (2.938)         ** 22.7888 (3.988)         ** 9.7841 (1.279)         **
Band-Pass (BP) Total Trade: 9.3066 (1.540)         ** 7.9594 (1.554)         ** 8.4188 (1.350)         **
Output: 23.5032 (3.050)         ** 21.9179 (3.869)         ** 10.2064 (1.315)         **
Index of Asymmetries Total Trade: -1.1881 (0.168)         ** -1.6417 (0.172)         ** -0.1924 (0.084)         **
(IA) Output: -2.9894 (0.419)         ** -4.2186 (0.389)         ** -0.1490 (0.103)        
II. Instrum ental Variables
Quadratic Trend (QT) Total Trade: 31.7612 (2.906)         ** 13.5892 (4.638)         ** 13.2930 (2.682)         **
Output: 59.3682 (5.583)         ** 45.6975 (8.711)         ** 29.0123 (4.871)         **
First Differences (1D) Total Trade: 26.7157 (1.945)         ** 8.2716 (2.996)         ** 10.1369 (1.653)         **
Output: 51.8705 (3.752)         ** 22.3010 (5.566)         ** 17.9882 (3.060)         **
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) Total Trade: 28.4345 (2.017)         ** 13.9700 (3.147)         ** 8.1570 (1.758)         **
Output: 54.0954 (3.890)         ** 36.2188 (5.864)         ** 15.4333 (3.207)         **
Band-Pass (BP) Total Trade: 29.1540 (2.006)         ** 14.2814 (3.031)         ** 9.5898 (1.733)         **
Output: 55.2017 (3.892)         ** 36.1712 (5.647)         ** 17.6408 (3.173)         **
Index of Asymmetries Total Trade: -4.3880 (0.154)         ** -6.1239 (0.278)         ** -1.2872 (0.152)         **
(IA) Output: -8.0522 (0.278)         ** -10.0059 (0.518)         ** -1.2668 (0.308)         **
       Note: * (**) implies that the variable is significant at the 10 (5) percent level. 
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Table 8. 
Regression Analysis: Cycle Correlation (CC) and Bilateral Trade Intensity (BTI) 
Different Sub-Samples of Country Pairs, 1960-99 
Augmented Model (M1) 
 
Trade Intensity  (IND,IND) Country Pairs  (IND,DEV) Country Pairs  (DEV,DEV) Country Pairs Asymmetries in Production
Filter Normalized by: Coeff. Std. Dev. Coeff. Std. Dev. Coeff. Std. Dev. Coeff. Std. Dev.
I. Ordinary Least Squares
Quadratic Trend (QT) Total Trade: 6.7384 (3.902)         * 12.8568 (3.988)         ** 8.0795 (2.517)         ** -0.1467 (0.023)            **
Output: 11.7005 (3.577)         ** 36.1732 (9.062)         ** 9.4587 (2.153)         ** -0.1523 (0.023)            **
First Differences (1D) Total Trade: 10.3704 (2.889)         ** 8.9507 (2.100)         ** 10.1606 (1.526)         ** -0.0171 (0.014)           
Output: 16.0044 (4.112)         ** 18.1198 (5.631)         ** 11.4696 (1.631)         ** -0.0190 (0.014)           
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) Total Trade: 13.6512 (3.100)         ** 9.5244 (2.367)         ** 9.4347 (1.516)         ** 0.0106 (0.015)           
Output: 18.5367 (5.061)         ** 24.5612 (5.584)         ** 10.2633 (1.478)         ** 0.0088 (0.015)           
Band-Pass (BP) Total Trade: 13.8959 (3.011)         ** 9.8139 (2.229)         ** 9.5695 (1.531)         ** -0.0152 (0.015)           
Output: 18.7126 (5.311)         ** 24.1659 (5.403)         ** 10.7058 (1.529)         ** -0.0183 (0.014)           
Index of Asymmetries Total Trade: -0.9697 (0.340)         ** -1.6720 (0.168)         ** -0.4862 (0.088)         ** 0.0241 (0.002)            **
(IA) Output: -1.1405 (0.443)         ** -4.4830 (0.475)         ** -0.5106 (0.091)         ** 0.0248 (0.001)            **
II. Instrumental Variables
Quadratic Trend (QT) Total Trade: 26.5024 (6.389)         ** 25.1898 (7.400)         ** 13.4319 (3.013)         ** -0.1380 (0.029)            **
Output: 49.3309 (11.436)       ** 66.2679 (13.606)       ** 28.6739 (5.634)         ** -0.1475 (0.029)            **
First Differences (1D) Total Trade: 27.3236 (4.262)         ** 8.4744 (4.733)         * 12.0838 (1.829)         ** 0.0038 (0.018)           
Output: 54.7655 (7.513)         ** 24.6038 (8.767)         ** 23.8845 (3.512)         ** 0.0007 (0.018)           
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) Total Trade: 34.4035 (4.370)         ** 13.7144 (4.990)         ** 11.0935 (1.955)         ** 0.0315 (0.019)            *
Output: 66.0169 (7.722)         ** 38.7101 (9.255)         ** 22.7004 (3.701)         ** 0.0313 (0.019)            *
Band-Pass (BP) Total Trade: 35.1521 (4.176)         ** 13.7439 (4.802)         ** 11.7204 (1.925)         ** 0.0074 (0.018)           
Output: 66.8851 (7.364)         ** 36.5847 (8.906)         ** 22.9917 (3.651)         ** 0.0053 (0.018)           
Index of Asymmetries Total Trade: -3.3772 (0.482)         ** -5.9970 (0.433)         ** -1.4103 (0.170)         ** 0.0167 (0.002)            **
(IA) Output: -5.9726 (0.836)         ** -10.4117 (0.814)         ** -2.0996 (0.325)         ** 0.0177 (0.002)            **
                   Note: * (**) implies that the variable is significant at the 10 (5) percent level. 
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Table 9. Regression Analysis: Cycle Correlation (CC) and Bilateral Trade Intensity (BTI) 
Different Sub-Samples of Country Pairs, 1960-99 
Basic Model (M0) 
 
Trade Intensity           1960-1969           1970-1979           1980-1989           1990-1999
Filter Normalized by: Coeff. Std. Dev. Coeff. Std. Dev. Coeff. Std. Dev. Coeff. Std. Dev.
I. Ordinary Least Squares
Quadratic Trend (QT) Total Trade: 3.2283 (3.511)           5.1781 (2.183)           ** 8.6838 (1.978)           ** 10.1318 (2.368)           **
Output: 2.6128 (4.473)           7.1674 (3.828)           * 12.0848 (2.527)           ** 13.2342 (2.729)           **
First Differences (1D) Total Trade: 3.6393 (1.387)           ** 10.3275 (2.753)           ** 6.7504 (1.601)           ** 10.0801 (1.576)           **
Output: 6.9201 (3.097)           ** 18.6639 (3.998)           ** 11.7618 (1.625)           ** 14.4354 (2.484)           **
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) Total Trade: 4.6640 (1.509)           ** 10.5692 (3.206)           ** 7.4160 (1.527)           ** 9.9156 (1.482)           **
Output: 8.9171 (3.412)           ** 19.5376 (3.773)           ** 11.4716 (1.855)           ** 13.9978 (2.525)           **
Band-Pass (BP) Total Trade: 5.7939 (1.317)           ** 10.5881 (3.047)           ** 7.5856 (1.402)           ** 10.1258 (1.641)           **
Output: 10.1778 (3.876)           ** 19.3459 (3.683)           ** 11.9409 (1.834)           ** 14.4396 (2.615)           **
Index of Asymmetries Total Trade: -1.1662 (0.260)           ** -1.1570 (0.238)           ** -0.7818 (0.134)           ** -0.8560 (0.113)           **
(IA) Output: -1.8326 (0.746)           ** -1.5186 (0.347)           ** -0.8035 (0.190)           ** -0.9615 (0.219)           **
II. Instrumental Variables
Quadratic Trend (QT) Total Trade: 8.7825 (4.493)           ** 17.6294 (3.701)           ** 17.3242 (3.309)           ** 26.5403 (3.172)           **
Output: 15.7422 (8.129)           * 30.5264 (7.045)           ** 35.7887 (6.217)           ** 40.9276 (5.938)           **
First Differences (1D) Total Trade: 8.4553 (2.912)           ** 20.4096 (2.625)           ** 12.1038 (2.321)           ** 20.3492 (2.255)           **
Output: 17.7975 (5.310)           ** 39.3636 (4.942)           ** 26.0417 (4.404)           ** 35.2738 (4.282)           **
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) Total Trade: 9.6701 (3.070)           ** 22.3622 (2.723)           ** 13.1324 (2.499)           ** 18.9495 (2.369)           **
Output: 18.9593 (5.546)           ** 44.7085 (5.020)           ** 23.9252 (4.754)           ** 36.3989 (4.415)           **
Band-Pass (BP) Total Trade: 12.4491 (3.217)           ** 22.9224 (2.665)           ** 12.9314 (2.443)           ** 20.3172 (2.290)           **
Output: 24.3664 (5.922)           ** 44.7405 (4.934)           ** 23.8822 (4.639)           ** 38.0715 (4.297)           **
Index of Asymmetries Total Trade: -3.7321 (0.253)           ** -3.6278 (0.273)           ** -2.1629 (0.196)           ** -3.0499 (0.203)           **
(IA) Output: -6.0977 (0.471)           ** -5.7236 (0.553)           ** -2.6211 (0.457)           ** -4.9137 (0.339)           **
                   Note: * (**) implies that the variable is significant at the 10 (5) percent level. 
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Table 10. Regression Analysis: Cycle Correlation (CC) and Bilateral Trade Intensity (BTI) 
Different Sub-Samples of Country Pairs, 1960-99 
Augmented Model (M1) 
Trade Intensity           1960-1969           1970-1979           1980-1989           1990-1999
Filter Normalized by: Coeff. Std. Dev. Coeff. Std. Dev. Coeff. Std. Dev. Coeff. Std. Dev.
I. Ordinary Least Squares
Quadratic Trend (QT) Total Trade: -1.9523 (3.768)           3.8100 (3.705)           10.7826 (2.813)           ** 12.1501 (2.460)           **
Output: -2.6418 (3.886)           4.1741 (4.671)           11.4573 (2.751)           ** 12.0138 (2.938)           **
First Differences (1D) Total Trade: 1.5741 (2.649)           12.5286 (2.120)           ** 7.2716 (2.119)           ** 13.0013 (1.912)           **
Output: 2.0182 (1.806)           16.4613 (5.511)           ** 10.4317 (1.634)           ** 13.8281 (2.938)           **
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) Total Trade: 1.8865 (2.511)           14.3999 (2.274)           ** 8.1693 (2.480)           ** 11.6228 (1.851)           **
Output: 2.9691 (1.813)           * 16.8733 (4.929)           ** 10.0439 (1.873)           ** 12.7641 (2.812)           **
Band-Pass (BP) Total Trade: -0.0661 (3.016)           13.8212 (2.149)           ** 8.2517 (2.334)           ** 12.8312 (1.958)           **
Output: 1.1990 (2.788)           16.6408 (4.762)           ** 10.6946 (1.815)           ** 13.5265 (3.037)           **
Index of Asymmetries Total Trade: -1.0067 (0.228)           ** -1.1997 (0.219)           ** -0.5668 (0.143)           ** -0.7529 (0.131)           **
(IA) Output: -0.8161 (0.373)           ** -1.1657 (0.336)           ** -0.5438 (0.139)           ** -0.7442 (0.195)           **
II. Instrumental Variables
Quadratic Trend (QT) Total Trade: 1.2121 (8.075)           12.8566 (5.071)           ** 21.1082 (4.325)           ** 20.4876 (4.022)           **
Output: 3.7124 (14.729)         25.7245 (9.768)           ** 41.1617 (8.357)           ** 32.0668 (7.613)           **
First Differences (1D) Total Trade: 6.1366 (5.154)           13.2783 (3.425)           ** 10.3631 (3.039)           ** 17.5662 (2.746)           **
Output: 15.1636 (9.785)           * 31.4713 (6.581)           ** 23.7773 (5.817)           ** 31.5028 (5.192)           **
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) Total Trade: 7.3675 (5.103)           16.6669 (3.821)           ** 11.8337 (3.321)           ** 16.0512 (2.891)           **
Output: 16.6514 (9.757)           * 39.3401 (7.344)           ** 22.5149 (6.289)           ** 32.5930 (5.342)           **
Band-Pass (BP) Total Trade: 3.8551 (5.493)           16.9013 (3.711)           ** 12.0964 (3.222)           ** 18.0056 (2.780)           **
Output: 11.2492 (10.401)         38.9636 (7.126)           ** 22.5063 (6.091)           ** 34.2963 (5.175)           **
Index of Asymmetries Total Trade: -2.2795 (0.472)           ** -2.4943 (0.420)           ** -1.2276 (0.270)           ** -2.4728 (0.254)           **
(IA) Output: -3.3778 (0.920)           ** -4.3176 (0.846)           ** -1.6672 (0.500)           ** -3.9507 (0.440)           **
                  Note: * (**) implies that the variable is significant at the 10 (5) percent level. 
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 Table 11. 
Regression Analysis: Cycle Correlation (CC) and Bilateral Trade Intensity (BTI) 
Different Sub-Samples of Country Pairs, 1960-99 
Basic Model (M0) 
 
Trade Intensity    Trade Intensity (BTI) BTI*Asym. Production Turning % Above
Filter Normalized by: Coeff. Std. Dev. Coeff. Std. Dev. Point Threshold
I. Ordinary Least Squares
Quadratic Trend (QT) Total Trade: 14.1531 (2.748)           ** -14.8629 (5.631)           ** 0.4761 32%
Output: 15.9053 (3.660)           ** -16.0190 (7.676)           ** 0.4965 29%
First Differences (1D) Total Trade: 13.4657 (1.819)           ** -9.5140 (3.663)           ** 0.7077 9%
Output: 17.4772 (2.855)           ** -13.2035 (5.217)           ** 0.6618 12%
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) Total Trade: 13.0620 (2.086)           ** -8.1808 (4.128)           ** 0.7983 5%
Output: 16.3725 (2.871)           ** -11.6627 (4.992)           ** 0.7019 9%
Band-Pass (BP) Total Trade: 14.2175 (1.995)           ** -10.7847 (3.594)           ** 0.6591 12%
Output: 17.9102 (3.002)           ** -14.5734 (4.970)           ** 0.6145 16%
Index of Asymmetries Total Trade: -0.7019 (0.168)           ** -0.30558 (0.407)           n/d n/d
(IA) Output: -0.5578 (0.200)           ** -0.48975 (0.377)           n/d n/d
II. Instrumental Variables
Quadratic Trend (QT) Total Trade: 29.6675 (4.359)           ** -44.4529 (12.986)         ** 0.3337 57%
Output: 55.6680 (8.257)           ** -89.7193 (24.718)         ** 0.3102 61%
First Differences (1D) Total Trade: 21.0451 (2.942)           ** -26.7136 (8.717)           ** 0.3939 46%
Output: 39.9461 (5.596)           ** -43.5974 (16.732)         ** 0.4581 35%
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) Total Trade: 22.7382 (3.133)           ** -30.5105 (9.178)           ** 0.3726 50%
Output: 42.7353 (5.944)           ** -47.1256 (17.603)         ** 0.4534 35%
Band-Pass (BP) Total Trade: 23.8062 (3.050)           ** -32.2501 (8.803)           ** 0.3691 50%
Output: 44.1518 (5.788)           ** -51.7167 (16.943)         ** 0.4269 40%
Index of Asymmetries Total Trade: -0.8811 (0.289)           ** -4.3705 (0.854)           ** n/d n/d
(IA) Output: -1.7349 (0.542)           ** -5.6741 (1.653)           ** n/d n/d
Note: * (**) implies that the variable is significant at the 10 (5) percent level. 
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 Figure 1. Impact of Trade Intensity on Output Correlation  
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 Appendix 1. 
Sample of Countries 
 
I. Industrial Countries (23) 
AUS  Australia  FIN  Finland   LUX  Luxembourg 
AUT  Austria   FRA  France    NLD  Netherlands 
BEL  Belgium   GBR  United  Kingdom   NOR  Norway 
CAN  Canada GRC  Greece    NZL  New  Zealand 
CHE  Switzerland  IRL  Ireland    PRT  Portugal 
DEU  Germany    ISL  Iceland    SWE  Sweden 
DNK  Denmark   ITA  Italy    USA  United  States 
ESP Spain    JPN Japan 
 
II. Developing Countries (124) 
East Asia and the Pacific (19) 
BRN  Brunei   KOR  Korea,  Rep.   SGP  Singapore 
CHN  China    MMR  Myanmar (Burma)  SLB  Solomon Is. 
COM  Comoros   MYS  Malaysia   THA  Thailand 
FJI  Fiji   NCL  New  Caledonia  TWN  Taiwan 
HKG Hong  Kong  PHL  Philippines    VUT Vanuatu 
IDN  Indonesia  PNG  Papua New Guinea  WSM  Samoa 
KIR Kiribati 
 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia (10) 
ALB  Albania  HUN  Hungary    ROM  Romania 
BGR Bulgaria  LVA Latvia      RUS Russian  Fed. 
CZE Czech  Rep.  POL Poland      SVK Slovak  Rep. 
EST Estonia 
 
Latin American and the Caribbean (33) 
ARG Argentina  DMA  Dominica    NIC  Nicaragua 
ATG  Antigua   DOM  Dominican  Rep.   PAN  Panama 
BHS  Bahamas   ECU  Ecuador    PER  Peru 
BLZ  Belize   GRD  Grenada    PRI  Puerto  Rico 
BMU  Bermuda   GTM  Guatemala   PRY  Paraguay 
BOL  Bolivia   GUY  Guyana   SLV  El  Salvador 
BRA  Brazil   HND  Honduras   SUR  Suriname 
BRB Barbados  HTI  Haiti     TTO Trinidad  &  Tobago 
CHL  Chile   JAM  Jamaica    URY  Uruguay 
COL Colombia  LCA St.  Lucia    VCT St.  Vincent 
CRI  Costa  Rica  MEX  Mexico   VEN  Venezuela 
 
Middle East and North Africa (17) 
ARE  Utd.Arab  Em.  ISR  Israel    OMN  Oman 
CYP  Cyprus   JOR  Jordan    SAU  Saudi  Arabia 
DZA  Algeria KWT  Kuwait    SYR  Syria 
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 EGY  Egypt   LBY  Libya    TUN  Tunisia 
IRN  Iran   MAR  Morocco    TUR  Turkey 
IRQ Iraq   MLT  Malta 
 
South Asia (6) 
BGD  Bangladesh  IND  India    NPL  Nepal 
BTN  Bhutan   LKA  Sri  Lanka   PAK  Pakistan 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa (39) 
AGO  Angola   GNB  Guinea-Bissau   RWA  Rwanda 
BDI  Burundi   KEN  Kenya    SDN  Sudan 
BEN  Benin   LBR  Liberia    SEN  Senegal 
BFA  Burkina  Faso  LSO  Lesotho    SLE  Sierra  Leone 
BWA Botswana  MDG Madagascar    SOM Somalia 
CAF  C.Africa  R.  MLI  Mali    SWZ  Swaziland 
CIV Ivory  Coast MOZ  Mozambique    SYC  Seychelles 
CMR Cameroon  MRT Mauritania    TCD  Chad 
COG  Congo   MUS  Mauritius   TGO  Togo 
ETH  Ethiopia  MWI  Malawi   ZAF  South  Africa 
GAB  Gabon   NAM  Namibia    ZAR  Congo,  Dem.  Rep. 
GHA  Ghana   NER  Niger    ZMB  Zambia 
GMB  Gambia  NGA  Nigeria  ZWE  Zimbabwe 
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